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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
RAY TWOHIG* and JEFFREY J. BUCKELS**

1. INTRODUCTION

This abbreviated survey period yielded few cases which have significance-beyond the defendants, their counsel and the extent of state prison
overcrowding. The most important case, Baca v. State,' changed the rule
on entrapment, placing New Mexico courts squarely and righteously in
the path of "sting" operations which create crimes to obtain convictions.
The period also saw the majority of the New Mexico Supreme Court
begin to wrest the high ground from the court of appeals in enforcing the
bill of rights and rooting out unfairness in the criminal justice process.
Many of the cases in this survey, however, merely apply constitutional
standards recently laid down by the United States Supreme Court.
I1.THE FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
A. Searches of High School Students

In State v. Michael G.,2 the court of appeals, for the first time, applied

3
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.

A student at Carlsbad High told the swimming coach that another student,
Michael G., had tried to sell him some marijuana.4 Without identifying
Michael G., the swimming coach notified two assistant principals. 5 The
assistant principals went to the swimming pool and the swimming coach
*An attorney in Albuquerque, New Mexico, who is engaged in a private law practice heavily
emphasizing white collar criminal defense. One of five New Mexico lawyers listed in the 1987 and
current editions of Best Lawyers in America, in the Criminal Defense category. Fellow, American
Board of Criminal Lawyers, J.D. (cum laude) Ohio State University, 1969; L.L.M. pending, Georgetown.
**Former judicial clerk to United States District Judge Edwin L. Mechem, now engaged in solo
practice of law in Albuquerque, New Mexico, with heavy emphasis in criminal law and civil rights.
Mr. Buckels attended the National Criminal Defense College in the summer of 1988. This is his
third article on criminal law for the New Mexico Law Review.
I. 106 N.M. 338, 742 P.2d 1043 (1987).
2. 106 N.M. 644, 748 P.2d 17 (1987).
3. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., the Court held that high school officials may search a student
without a warrant, "when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the laws or the rules of the school." Id.
at 341-42. Probable cause is not required. Id.
4. 106 N.M. at 645, 748 P.2d at 18.
5. Id.
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pointed out Michael G.6 The assistant principals subsequently searched
Michael G.'s locker and found two marijuana cigarettes. 7
Michael G. was on probation at the time.' The state filed a motion to
revoke his probation based on the discovery of the marijuana. 9 The trial
court denied Michael G.'s motion to suppress the marijuana as the fruit
of an unreasonable search and revoked his probation." Michael G. appealed. "
The court of appeals first had to decide whether its decision in Doe v.
State" had survived T.L.O. In Doe, the court had enumerated factors to
be considered in deciding whether "reasonable suspicion" existed to
justify a school search. 3 These were the child's age and history of disciplinary problems; the prevalence in the school of the problem at which
the search was aimed; the need to make an immediate search; and the
probative value and reliability of the information leading to the search.' 4
The court of appeals concluded that the United States Supreme Court's
general "reasonable grounds" approach in T.L.O. indicated that the Doe
factors could no longer be mechanically applied. '" Still, the Doe factors
would continue "to provide a useful guide in determining whether a school
search was reasonable under the fourth amendment. "6
Applying these standards, the court of appeals found that reasonable
grounds existed to search Michael G.'s locker. '" The court gave greatest
weight to the credibility of the student's statement. 8 The court likened
the student's statement to that of a disinterested citizen informant. 9 The
court stated generally that a student's direct statement to a school official
indicating personal knowledge of facts that would establish that another
student is engaging in illegal conduct may provide reasonable grounds
to search. 20 A statement which merely relays rumors or suspicions, however, will not do. 2'
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1975).
13. Id.at 352, 540 P.2d at 832.
14. Id.
15. 106 N.M. at 647, 748 P.2d at 20.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See United States v. Gagnon, 635 F.2d 766 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018
(1981).
20. 106 N.M. at 647, 748 P.2d at 20.
21. Id.
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B. Police Roadblocks
On March 5, 1987, the court of appeals announced two decisions
involving police roadblocks. In City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt,22 the
court considered for the first time whether "police roadblocks set up for
the purpose of detecting and apprehending drunk drivers" are permissible
under the fourth amendment. 23
On New Year's Eve of 1985 the City of Las Cruces set up a roadblock
on a major downtown street to detect drunk drivers.24 The police arrested
Betancourt and another defendant as a result of the roadblock.25 Both
admitted they were driving drunk and both were convicted of DWI. 26 On
appeal, they argued that the roadblock violated the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable seizures.27

The court of appeals stated that in deciding whether a roadblock is
reasonable, it is necessary to "balance the gravity of the governmental
interest or public concern served by the roadblock, the degree to which
it advances these concerns and the severity of the interference with individual liberty, security, and privacy .... "28 The court declared that the
governmental interest in protecting the public from drunk drivers was so
great that any reasonable attempt to remove drunk drivers from the road
would be upheld, as long as motorists were not subjected "to arbitrary
invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field." 29
The court then enumerated eight guidelines to be weighed in considering the reasonableness of a roadblock: (1) the role of supervisory personnel (high ranking officials should make the decision to set up the
roadblock and should select the site and procedures); (2) restrictions on
discretion of field officers (cars should not be stopped randomly but
according to some mechanical system, such as every third car); (3) safety
(approaching traffic should be warned of the roadblock); (4) reasonable
location; (5) time of day and duration (late evening hours on a weekend
may be reasonable, but not Monday morning during rush hour); (6) indicia
of the official nature of the roadblock (scene should provide high visibility
22. 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 618, 735 P.2d 535 (1987).
23. 105 N.M. at 656, 735 P.2d at 1162. Three cases had previously considered roadblock checks
of driver's licenses and vehicle registration. See State v. Bloom, 90 N.M. 192, 561 P.2d 465 (1977);
State v. Bidegain, 88 N.M. 466, 541 P.2d 971 (1975); State v. Ruud, 90 N.M. 647, 567 P.2d 496
(Ct. App. 1977).
24. 105 N.M. at 656, 735 P.2d at 1162.
25. Id. at 657, 735 P.2d at 1163.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 658, 735 P.2d at 1164.
29. Id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979); Annotation, Validity of Routine Roadblocks by State or Local Police for Purpose of
Discovery of Vehicular or Driving Violations, 37 A.L.R.4th 10 (1985).
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but minimize undue apprehension); (7) length and nature of detention;
and (8) advance publicity (the roadblock should be publicized for its
deterrent effect).3" The court applied these guidelines to the facts of the
3
case and found no fourth amendment violation.
In a decision announced on the same day as Betancourt, another panel
of the court of appeals applied the Betancourt guidelines. In State v.
Olaya,32 the defendant's detention at a police roadblock resulted in a full
search of his car and eventually in his conviction for possession of cocaine.33 On appeal, he challenged, among other things, the validity of
his initial detention at the roadblock. 34
At the instance of their immediate supervisor, two highway patrolmen
35
set up a roadblock on 1-40 about 20 miles from the Texas border. The
patrolmen chose the exact spot.36 They stopped "all privately-owned,
37
east-bound vehicles" to check licenses and registrations. In accordance
with their supervisor's instructions, they used reflectors, marked patrol
38
cars, and a stop sign to alert motorists to the roadblock.
Relying on Delaware v. Prouse,39 Olaya complained of the absence of
guidelines setting specific limits on "the unbridled discretion of the police
officers."' Noting that such unbridled discretion in field officers creates
the danger of pretextual stops, the court of appeals, nevertheless, validated
the roadblock in this case. 4 The court stated that, apart from the absence
of advance publicity, the roadblock "satisfied the intent" of each Betancourt guideline.4 2
The court of appeals did not discuss several ways in which the roadblock
in Olaya did not comply with the Betancourt guidelines. Contrary to the
first guideline, 43 the field officers themselves chose the site for the roadblock. Further, the court was not clear on who had decided that commercial vehicles would not be stopped. 4 The second Betancourt guideline
30. 105 N.M. at 658-59, 735 P.2d at 1164-65.
31. The court stressed that the city bore the burden of demonstrating the legality of the roadblock.
Id. at 659, 735 P.2d at 1165.
32. 105 N.M. 690, 736 P.2d 495 (Ct. App.), ceri. denied, 105 N.M. 689, 736 P.2d 494 (1987).
33. Id. at 691, 736 P.2d at 496.
34. Id. at 692, 736 P.2d at 497.
35. Id. 'at 691, 736 P.2d at 496.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Rouse, the Supreme Court held that "persons in automobiles or
public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the
unbridled discretion of police officers." 440 U.S. at 663.
40. 105 N.M. at 693, 736 P.2d at 498.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 691, 736 P.2d at 496.
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makes this the supervisor's decision. 45 If the field officers made both these
decisions, then they retained significant, if not "unbridled," discretion.
The court of appeals stressed, however, as it had done in Betancourt,a6
that "no one guideline is dispositive . . . . " Substantial evidence had
supported the trial court's finding that the field officers "did not have or
exercise unbridled discretion ....
Betancourt and Olaya have established an analytical framework for
considering the validity of roadblocks under the fourth amendment. Neither case, however, rigidly binds the lower courts to the eight guidelines.
Courts are to be guided by the principle that the public must be protected
both from the unfettered exercise of power by field officers and from
drunk drivers. Finally, counsel should note that a trial court's conclusion
that field officers were adequately controlled will be reviewed on appeal
for "substantial evidence" only. 49
III. NATURE OF THE CRIME
A. Requirement of Knowledge
In Reese v. State,5" the supreme court overruled Rutledge v. Fort5 and
decided that conviction of the crime of assault or battery on a peace officer
requires proof that the defendant knew the victim was a peace officer.52
Rutledge had been based on the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Feola.53 Courts and commentators had understood Feola to hold that the defendant's knowledge of the identity of the
victim was neither necessary nor relevant in a prosecution for assault
upon a federal officer.5 4 However, the federal circuits and various states
now understand Feola to say that conviction is improper when the defendant acts from a mistaken belief that he is threatened with an intentional
tort by a private citizen.55
The supreme court in Reese did not make clear under what circumstances knowledge of the official identity of the victim is an essential
45. Id.
46. Betancourt, 105 N.M. at 658, 735 P.2d at 1164.
47. Olaya, 105 N.M. at 693, 736 P.2d at 498.
48. Id.
49. id.
50. 106 N.M. 498, 745 P.2d 1146 (1987).
51. See Rutledge v. Fort, 104 N.M. 7, 715 P.2d 455 (1986). Rutledge and Reese were in fact
the same case. For the rather tortured procedural history of the case, see the subsequent Reese v.
State, 106 N.M. 505, 745 P.2d 1153 (1987).
52. The court based its conclusion on the requirements of due process and not on the language
of the statutes. 106 N.M. at 499, 745 P.2d at 1147. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§30-22-22 and -24
(Repl. Pamp. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1987).
53. 420 U.S. 671 (1975).,
54. Reese, 106 N.M. at 499, 745 P.2d at 1147.
55. Id. at 500, 745 P.2d at 1148.
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element of the crime in New Mexico. The court appeared to state that
such knowledge will always be required: "[W]e explicitly overrule our
holding in Rutledge insofar as it holds that a defendant's knowledge as
to the identity of the peace officer assaulted is not a necessary element
of the crimes ... ."6 Elsewhere, however, the court appeared to limit
the requirement to cases where the defendant mistakenly believes that he
is being threatened by a private citizen.57
Basic criminal law principles of deterrence and retribution suggest that
knowledge of the official status of the victim should be a required element
of assault or battery upon a peace officer.58 Defense counsel, however,
cannot completely rely on the language quoted above that makes knowledge a "necessary element" of the statutory offense, but may have the
burden of going forward with some evidence of mistaken identity before
relying on the lack of proof on the issue.
B. Unauthorized Entry
In State v. Sanchez,59 the court of appeals addressed the question of
what constitutes an "unauthorized entry" within the meaning of the New
Mexico burglary statutes." Sanchez stole a purse from an office in Presbyterian Hospital in Albuquerque.6" Landlee, the defendant in a consolidated case, was arrested in the loading dock area of A.P.K. Auto Parts,
a retail store.62 It was undisputed that Presbyterian and the auto parts
store were open to the public ,63The defendants were convicted of burglary
because they entered into restricted areas of these public places.' The
court of appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that where a building
is only partly open to the public, a defendant may be convicted of burglary
if he enters an area not open to the public with the intent to commit a
crime.'
The trouble with the holding, as noted by Judge Apodaca in a concurring
opinion,' is that to be convicted of burglary, a defendant must know his
entry is unauthorized.67 In the case of a building plainly open to the public
56. Id. at 499, 745 P.2d at1147.
57. Id. at 500, 745 P.2d at1148. Reese defended on the basis of just such a mistaken belief. Id.
at498-99, 745 P.2d at 1146-47. Feola requires scienter inthese circumstances only. 420 U.S. at
686.
58. See generally, Note, Criminal Law, 17 N.M.L. REV. 433 (1987).
59. 105 N.M. 619, 735 P.2d 536 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 618, 735 P.2d 535 (1987).
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§30-16-3 to-4(Repl. Pamp. 1984).
61. 105 N.M. at620, 735 P.2d at537.
62. Id. at619-20, 735 P.2d at536-37.
63. Id. at620, 735 P.2d at537.
64. id. at619-20, 735 P.2d at536-37.
65. Id.at621-22, 735 P.2d at538-39.
66. Id. at622-23, 735 P.2d at539-40.
67. Id. at 622, 735 P.2d at 539 (citing State v. Ruiz, 94 N.M. 771, 617 P.2d 160 (Ct. App.
1980)).
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to some extent, how is the jury to determine the limit of the public
invitation?
Judge Apodaca suggested that juries should be instructed that the invitation extends to all areas "which by their physical nature, function,
custom, usage, notice or lack thereof, or other circumstances . . . would
cause a reasonable person to believe that no permission to enter or remain
is required." 68 This is the rule in at least three jurisdictions. 69 The opinion
of the court did not discuss this sensible approach. This approach should
be adopted because New Mexico's criminal uniform jury instructions are
so spare and barren in places that they abdicate the judicial role to the
fact finder.
C. The Degrees of Homicide
In State v. Fero,7 ° the supreme court clarified the distinction between
second degree murder and manslaughter. Fero was the principal of a high
school. 7 ' To friends he appeared disturbed, even suicidal, the day before
a scheduled evaluation with his superintendent, Hansen." The two men
had a history of conflict.73 Fero claimed that at the evaluation, Hansen
criticized him sharply, ridiculed him and then fired him. 74 Fero claimed
that as he departed a gun fell out of his portfolio.75 The next he knew,
Hansen was on the floor with five bullet holes in him. 76
The trial court instructed on both first degree murder and on second
degree murder based on mental illness, but refused to instruct on manslaughter.77 Fero was convicted of first degree murder.78
The supreme court held the instruction on second degree murder appropriate, because the jury could have believed that Fero was, in fact,
out of control. 79 The trial court, however, properly refused the manslaughter instruction. 0 Manslaughter requires such provocation as would
cause "an ordinary person of average disposition"81 to lose control.82
68. 105 N.M. at 622, 735 P.2d at 539.
69. See OR. REV. STAT. § 164-205(4) (1971); People v. Bozeman, 624 P.2d 916 (Colo. Ct. App.
1980); State v. McGinnis, 622 S.W.2d 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
70. 105 N.M. 339, 732 P.2d 866 (1987).
71. Id. at 341, 732 P.2d at 868.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 342, 732 P.2d at 869.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 343, 732 P.2d at 870.
80. Id.
81. N.M. U.J.1. CRIM. 14-222 (Recomp. 1986).
82. Id.
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83
Hansen's behavior was not sufficiently provocative.
4 Non-informational statements,
Hansen derided and ridiculed Fero.
however, including forms of derision and ridicule, do not constitute ad85
equate provocation for manslaughter. The ordinary person of average
disposition is required to absorb such sticks and stones. Still, Hansen did
not simply deride and ridicule Fero. He derisively informed Fero that
86
Fero had been fired. Information can constitute adequate provocation.
The supreme court held that Hansen's information could not supply
provocation, however, because Hansen had "not just a legal right, but a
87
public duty" to evaluate Fero's performance as principal. The court had
held previously that, in general, the exercise of a legal right cannot supply
88
adequate provocation for manslaughter. The supreme court left open the
possibility that in some other case the performance of a public duty89may
be sufficiently "egregious" in manner so as to supply provocation.

IV. SENTENCING
A. Crimes Outside the Criminal Code
°
On February 23, 1987, the court of appeals ruled in State v. Greyeyes,
that 90 days is both the minimum and the maximum jail sentence for a
91
second or subsequent conviction of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI).
On the date of the court of appeals' decision, the DWI statute, not a part
of the Criminal Code, made a second or subsequent conviction punishable
"by imprisonment for not less than ninety days nor more than one
year. .... "92 However, the Criminal Sentencing Act provides that crimes
outside the Criminal Code shall be punished according to the minimum
of a
jail term prescribed in the statute.93 Therefore, Greyeyes, convicted
94
second or subsequent DWI, could be jailed for 90 days only.
The court of appeals went out of its way to note that unambiguous
statutes "must be read and given effect as ... written by the legisla83. E.g., State v. Castro, 92 N.M. 585, 592 P.2d 185 (Ct. App. 1979).
84. 105 N.M. at 343, 732 P.2d at 870.
85. Id. at 343-44, 732 P.2d at 870-71.
86. Sells v. State, 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162 (1982).
87. 105 N.M. at 344, 732 P.2d at 871.
88. State v. Maners, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979).
89. 105 N.M. at 344, 732 P.2d at 871. Presumably, this weighing of egregiousness would be
left to the jury. If so, one could argue that it could have been left to the jury, and not to the judge,
in this case.
90. 105 N.M. 549, 734 P.2d 789 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 521, 734 P.2d 761 (1987).
91. Id. at 553, 734 P.2d at 793.
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. §66-8-102(E) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
93. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-18-13(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1981 & Repl. Pamp. 1987).
94. 105 N.M. at 552, 734 P.2d at 792. He had been given a one-year sentence by the trial court.
Id. at 550, 734 P.2d at 790.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

Fall 19891

ture. . . . "95It is the legislature's work to set the penalties for the crimes. 96
The New Mexico Legislature responded promptly. Effective April 7,
1987, the DWI statute was amended to add the words "notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 31-18-13 N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978" to both paragraphs setting the penalties for DWI. 97 Therefore, despite the provisions
of the Criminal Sentencing Act and despite Greyeyes, judges presumably
once more have discretion to give 90 days to one year to second or
subsequent DWI offenders.
B. Relationship Between Parole and Consecutive Underlying Sentences
In Brock v. Sullivan,98 the supreme court considered how parole terms
attached to consecutive underlying sentences should run. Brock was convicted of four fourth-degree felonies. 99 For each mandatory 18 month
sentence, the trial court ordered a year's probation "after the service of
the actual period of imprisonment. ... ""
At the end of Brock's prison term, the Parole Board interpreted the
trial court's order of parole to mean that Brock would now serve four
consecutive parole terms of one year each.'° In short, the Parole Board
saw four "stacked" prison terms followed by four "stacked" paroles:
SI
S2
S3
S4
P1
P2
P3
P4
Brock disagreed with this interpretation, and so did the supreme court."
The Sentencing Act does not require "consecutive sentences to be completed prior to the commencement of the parole period for each basic
sentence."'0 3 Rather, the legislature intended each parole period to run
concurrently with any subsequent jail sentence:'

S1

P1
S2

P2
S3

P3
S4

P4

In the context of "stacked" underlying sentences, the parole period for
each offense "commences immediately after the period of imprisonment
for that offense.
95. Id. at 553, 734 P.2d at 793 (citing Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M. 219, 308 P.2d 199 (1957)).
96. Id.
97. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 68-8-102(D) and (E) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
98. 105 N.M. 412, 733 P.2d 860 (1987).
99. Id. at 413, 733 P.2d at 861.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 414, 733 P.2d at 862 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-18-15(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1981)).
104. 105 N.M. at 414, 733 P.2d at 862.
105. Id.
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V. JURIES

In a case of first impression in New Mexico, the court of appeals in
State v. Holloway considered whether a juror's attempt during a poll of
the jury to qualify or change her vote "casts a cloud on the validity of
the verdict. . .. "" After the foreman announced verdicts convicting
Holloway of criminal sexual penetration and criminal sexual contact of
07
a minor, the defense requested a poll of the jury.' Juror Carol Caldwell
8o This dialogue followed:
was asked, "Is this your verdict?"'
Caldwell: Yes, can I qualify it? Can I just say . .
Court: Is this your verdict?
Caldwell: Yes.' °"

.?

Defense counsel did not object to the court's entry of the verdict."°
On appeal, the court of appeals stated that the sixth amendment guarantees a unanimous verdict at which each juror has freely 2arrived. "'
Fundamental justice requires a verdict "free from ambiguity. ""' The court
of appeals held that it is the trial judge's duty to preserve the defendant's
13
right to a voluntary and unanimous verdict.' Accordingly, the judge's
4 If a juror's response to the question,
poll must be more than a formality.
"Is this your verdict?" should alert the judge to uncertainty, the judge
must "question further to give the juror full opportunity to indicate his
present state of mind." 15
The court of appeals agreed with the state's argument that the trial6
court has discretion concerning the manner in which the jury is polled."
Still, the trial judge must respond to a juror's reluctance to assent.'
Here, juror Caldwell plainly had reservations. The trial judge abused his
discretion in neither inquiring further nor directing the jury to continue
deliberating.' 8 Because the judge allowed ambiguity to remain, the verdict was not unanimous."'
Defense counsel should always request a jury poll. If ambiguities ap106. 106 N.M. 161, 163, 740 P.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 1987).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 164, 740 P.2d at 714.
112. Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Martinez, 99 N.M. 66, 73, 653 P.2d 897, 904 (Ct. App. 1982)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 165, 740 P.2d at 715.
115. Id. SCRA 1986, 5-611(E) provides that "[ilf upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to retire for further deliberations."
116. 106 N.M. at 165, 740 P.2d at 715.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 166, 740 P.2d at 716.
119. Id.
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pear during such a poll, counsel will have to consider whether to pursue
the ambiguities if the trial court fails to do so or to await an appeal to
present the issue.
VI. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE'

20

During the survey period, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed
its 1985 decision in State v. Earnest,'2' on remand from the Supreme
Court of the United States. In Earnest I, the court had held that the
defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial judge had admitted,
against Earnest, the pretrial statement of Earnest's accomplice who did
not take the stand at trial and thus could not be cross-examined concerning
the statement. 22 In reversing the trial court, the supreme court had relied
on decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, all of which required some pretrial opportunity for
"full and complete2 cross
examination" before such a pretrial statement
3
could be admitted.'
The state appealed Earnest I to the Supreme Court of the United
States.' 24 Before reviewing Earnest 1, however, the Court issued its decision in Lee v. Illinois.'2 5 The facts in Lee were virtually identical to
those in Earnest I. A co-defendant's confession was admitted as substantive evidence, even though the co-defendant could not be cross-examined. 126 The Supreme Court held that the incriminating confessions of
accomplices are only presumptively unreliable and inadmissible. 27 Some
confessions may bear sufficient "indicia and reliability" to overcome the
presumption. 28 Having decided Lee, the Supreme Court
29 vacated Earnest
I and remanded for proceedings consistent with Lee.'
On remand,' 3 ° the New Mexico Supreme Court presumed, no doubt
correctly, that the United States Supreme Court intended that the state be
given a chance to overcome the presumptive unreliability of the co120. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.
... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
121. 103 N.M. 95, 703 P.2d 872 (1985).
122. Id. at 98, 703 P.2d at 875.
123. 448 U.S. 56 (1980); United States v. Allen, 409 F.2d 611 (10th Cir. 1969).
124. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986).
125. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. In the more recent United States v. Owens, 108 S.Ct. 838 (1988), the Supreme Court held
that neither the Confrontation Clause nor Federal Rule of Evidence 802 is violated by the admission
of a prior, out-of-court statement of identification of a witness who is unable, because of memory
loss, to explain the basis of the identification.
129. 477 U.S. at 677.
130. State v. Earnest, 106 N.M. 411, 744 P.2d 539 (1987) (Earnest1I).
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defendant's confession.' 3 ' Since a pretrial opportunity to cross-examine
the accomplice was no longer absolutely required, the New Mexico Supreme Court found in Earnest 11 sufficient "indicia of reliability" in the
accomplice's statement to make it admissible:3 2 the co-defendant was
not offered leniency in exchange for the statement; the statement was
against the co-defendant's penal interest; the statement did not shift responsibility to the defendant from the co-defendant; and independent
33
evidence adduced at trial corroborated the co-defendant's statements.
VII. ENTRAPMENT
In Baca v. State, 34 the supreme court issued its most important opinion
of the survey period, deciding New Mexico's first "sting" case differently
than many federal courts have done. Rejecting precedent, the court decided that the defense of entrapment may be established either by showing
the defendant's lack of predisposition toward committing a crime, the
sole test previously, or by showing that the police exceeded the standards
of proper investigation. 135
The police had been using Granger, an informant, in an undercover
narcotics operation.' 36 Granger introduced the defendant to undercover
Officer Work, who masqueraded as Granger's friend. 13'Granger told Baca
that he wanted to sell cocaine to Work, but owed Work money and was
afraid of him, and so needed Baca's help.' 38 Granger and Baca went to
a trailer where Granger bought the cocaine. '9 Granger then gave it to
Baca to "sell" to Work for him.'" When Work paid Baca $130 for the
cocaine by prearrangement with Granger, Baca was arrested. "'
These facts showed that the police instigated at least one completely
phony drug buy, being both buyer and seller. The defendant was a gobetween. The trial court instructed the jury on entrapment, but the jury
convicted.' 42 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the facts established
the defense of entrapment as a matter of law. 143
Before Baca, the controlling New Mexico case was State v. Fiechter,'44
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which held that "the key issue for the trier of fact where the defense of
entrapment is asserted is the defendant's predisposition to commit the
crime."' 4 5 This is the so-called "subjective" approach to entrapment. The
"objective" approach considers whether any police misconduct would
have encouraged a person to engage in crime.' 46
The debate concerning the objective and subjective bases of entrapment
dates to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1932 in
Sorrells v. United States. 47
' Sorrells held that the government may not
argue that the accused is guilty of a crime which the government itself
instigated,' 48 but the Court added that the "predisposition and criminal
designs of the defendant are relevant."' 49 Sherman v. United States5 °
followed Sorrells, again leaving open the question of the exact significance of predisposition.''
The leading case for the objective approach to entrapment is the Fifth
Circuit decision in United States v. Bueno. 12 In Bueno, one police agent
supplied the drug, while another persuaded the defendant to act as the
go-between, handing the defendant the money to be passed to the first
agent. ' Citing Sorrells, the Fifth Circuit upheld the defense of entrapment, attributing the crime to "the creative activity of the government."' 5 4
The New Mexico Supreme Court found the facts of Bueno indistinguishable from those of Baca, and these facts presented "a perfect illustration of why something more than a subjective standard is needed
to define entrapment."' 5 The objective test of entrapment is necessary
to deter the police from creating crime "for the sole purpose of prosecuting
and punishing it." ' 56
Practitioners should note that the supreme court emphasized that evidence either of lack of predisposition or of police misconduct may make
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out a prima facie defense of entrapment. 5' 7 Further, beyond the facts of
Baca in any case in which the accused can show that the government
initiated events for the sole purpose of creating crime, counsel should
argue that the defense of entrapment has been established as a matter of
law. 158
VIII. CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the New Mexico appellate courts provided
considerable practical guidance to the bar in such cases as Betancourti
Olaya, Greyeyes, Brock, and Holloway. Conversely, the decisions in
Reese and Sanchez may simply have muddied the waters. In the last
analysis, Baca is the case of the survey period. The supreme court acted
courageously and correctly in handing down Baca in spite of the evermounting anti-drug hysteria in this country.
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